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PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN: SOLVING THE  
COMPETENCY DILEMMA BY BROADENING THE CONCEPT 
OF RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING IN COMPETENCY-TO-BE-
EXECUTED DETERMINATIONS 
Gary R. Studen∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fifty-three individuals were executed in the United States in 
2006,1 placing the United States sixth on a list of total number of 
known executions carried out by a country that year.2  Although this 
country’s criminal justice system protects a person who is incompe-
tent3 from standing trial4 and from being held criminally liable,5 
there is a growing concern among legal and mental health organiza-
tions over the lack of a clear standard to be used in determining 
whether a prisoner is mentally competent to be executed.6  A pris-
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Univer-
sity of Maryland.  The author would like to thank Professor John Wefing for his in-
valuable assistance in writing this Comment. 
 1 DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., EXECUTIONS BY YEAR (2008), http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=&&did= 146. 
 2 Amnesty International USA, http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang 
=e&id=ENGACT500122007 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). 
 3 References to “competence” in this Comment are understood to refer to a pris-
oner’s mental state, separate and aside from the issue of mental retardation.  This 
term is also synonymous with “insanity” in this context.  The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
321 (2002).  Competence along the lines of insanity does not necessarily result in 
diminished intelligence, as is the case with mental retardation.  Ronald S. Honberg, 
The Injustice of Imposing Death Sentences on People with Severe Mental Illnesses, 54 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2005). 
 4 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (“[T]he standard for compe-
tence to stand trial is whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a ra-
tional as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”) (citing 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1962) (per curiam)). 
 5 See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 577 (1994) (noting that an insanity 
defense enables a jury to find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity). 
 6 Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Consider Impact of Mental Illness on Death Penalty, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at A12. 
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oner may be deemed competent upon entering death row, but, due 
to factors such as death row syndrome,7 a death row inmate’s mental 
state can gradually deteriorate. 
In Ford v. Wainwright,8 the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits a state from executing a prisoner who is men-
tally incapable of understanding the reason for the individual’s im-
pending execution.9  However, the majority failed to specify either a 
precise legal test for determining whether a prisoner is competent to 
be executed or the proper procedures for an evidentiary hearing on 
the inmate’s competency.10  In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell 
outlined a standard for determining an inmate’s competency to be 
executed, stating “that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution 
only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to 
suffer and why they are to suffer it.”11  Justice Powell’s competency 
test became the constitutional benchmark for courts to interpret and 
implement.12  Until Panetti v. Quarterman,13 the Supreme Court had 
not analyzed whether Justice Powell’s competency standard requires 
that an inmate simply be “aware” of the factual predicate for the in-
mate’s execution or that an inmate also “rationally understand” the 
connection between the crime and the execution.14
This Comment examines the recent decision in Panetti and its ef-
fect on the constitutional standard for determining an inmate’s com-
petency to be executed.  Although the Court rejected the compe-
tency test articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit15 and held that an inmate must rationally, as well as fac-
 7 The term “death row syndrome” achieved notoriety in a decision by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.  See Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 
474–77 (1989).  The term refers to the extreme psychological stress an inmate faces 
due to several factors, such as length of time and living conditions on death row.  Id. 
at 474–75. 
 8 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 9 Id. at 410. 
 10 Kimberley S. Ackerson et al., Judges’ and Psychologists’ Assessments of Legal and 
Clinical Factors in Competence for Execution, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 164, 167 (2005). 
 11 Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part). 
 12 Amir Vonsover, Comment, No Reason for Exemption: Singleton v. Norris and In-
voluntary Medication of Mentally Ill Capital Murderers for the Purpose of Execution, 7 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 311, 316 (2004). 
 13 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). 
 14 Tim Birnbaum, Legal Information Institute, Panetti v. Quarterman (06-6407), 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/06-6407.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). 
 15 The Fifth Circuit test deemed a prisoner’s rational understanding of the con-
nection between the prisoner’s crime and execution irrelevant to whether the pris-
oner was competent under Justice Powell’s test in Ford.  See Panetti v. Dretke, 448 
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tually, understand the reasons for the prisoner’s execution,16 the 
Court declined to articulate a proper test for competency determina-
tions.17  Part II of this Comment provides a historical overview of the 
prohibition against executing the mentally incompetent, briefly re-
counting both ethical and moral considerations as well as case his-
tory.  Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford and that 
decision’s impact on both the procedural and substantive aspects of 
competency determinations from a constitutional perspective.  Part 
IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Panetti.  Part V discusses 
the ramifications of Panetti, including its broadening of the substan-
tive Ford competency test.  Finally, Part VI suggests that courts look to 
other areas of competency law which discuss the issue of rationality in 
order to craft a proper test for competency-to-be-executed determi-
nations. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST  
EXECUTING THE INCOMPETENT18
The prohibition against executing the mentally incompetent 
dates back to about the thirteenth century.19  William Blackstone dis-
cussed the common law rule and stated that “if a man in his sound 
memory commits a capital offence . . . and if after judgment he be-
comes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed.”20  There are 
five historical justifications for the prohibition against executing the 
mentally incompetent:21 (1) that it offends humanity,22 (2) that it con-
tributes little to the goal of deterrence,23 (3) that it is contrary to reli-
gious beliefs,24 (4) that insanity is a punishment in itself,25 and (5) 
F.3d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Justice Powell did not state that a prisoner must ‘ra-
tionally understand’ the reason for his execution, only that he must be ‘aware’ of 
it.”). 
 16 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862. 
 17 Id. 
 18 The Eighth Amendment was not incorporated into the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment until 1947.  See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 
U.S. 459, 463 (1947). 
 19 See Paul J. Larkin, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently 
Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 778 (1980) (noting that the prohibition against 
executing the mentally incompetent dates back to medieval times). 
 20 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *24 (1979). 
 21 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407–08 (1986). 
 22 Id. at 407. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 407–08. 
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that retribution is not served because executing an incompetent in-
mate is unequal in moral value to the inmate’s crime.26
Prior to the decision in Ford, the Supreme Court consistently de-
clined to address the constitutionality of executing the mentally in-
competent.  In 1897, the Court decided Nobles v. Georgia,27 in which 
the defendant claimed after sentencing that her insanity precluded 
her from being executed.28  The Court disposed of the case on pro-
cedural grounds and held that a sentenced defendant who claims in-
sanity does not have a right to a competency determination before a 
court and a jury; rather, the state legislature has the power to deter-
mine whether and how to implement procedures for such a determi-
nation.29
In 1948, in Phyle v. Duffy,30 the Court faced two questions: (1) 
whether it was constitutional to execute an insane inmate, and (2) 
whether a state doctor could make an ex parte decision that an indi-
vidual was sane to be executed even though the inmate was already 
declared insane after the conviction.31  The Court declined to rule on 
the first question, stating that the petitioner had not exhausted state 
remedies.32  As to the second question, the Court held that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state 
from allowing an ex parte determination that an inmate is sane to be 
executed without some method for the inmate to challenge the de-
termination.33
The 1950 case of Solesbee v. Balkcom34 provided the Court with 
another opportunity to address the constitutionality of executing the 
insane.  The Court once again declined to address this issue on the 
grounds that the narrow question before the Court was whether 
Georgia violated an inmate’s due process rights by allowing the gov-
ernor to ultimately decide an inmate’s sanity.35  The Court held that 
the prisoner’s due process rights were not violated by entrusting the 
governor with this power.36
 26 Id. at 408. 
 27 168 U.S. 398 (1897). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 409. 
 30 334 U.S. 431 (1948). 
 31 Id. at 433–34, 439–40. 
 32 Id. at 440. 
 33 Id. at 437. 
 34 339 U.S. 9 (1950). 
 35 Id. at 12. 
 36 Id. 
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In 1986, when Ford was decided, twenty-six states expressly pro-
hibited the execution of the mentally incompetent by statute, and 
these states had a legal test governing competency determinations.37  
Other states adopted the prohibition against executing the mentally 
incompetent through judicial decisions.38
III. FORD V. WAINWRIGHT39
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In 1974, Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death without any indication that he might be incompetent.40  Ford 
began to exhibit delusional behavior in 1982, believing that the Ku 
Klux Klan had a conspiracy to force him to commit suicide and be-
lieving that prison officials were holding his family members hostage 
inside the prison.41  Under a Florida statute,42 Ford requested a com-
petency hearing to determine whether he had “the mental capacity to 
understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it 
was imposed upon him.”43  Three psychiatrists met with Ford, and all 
of them determined that Ford was competent to be executed under 
Florida law, despite varying individual diagnoses.44  Ford attempted to 
submit psychiatric evaluations conducted by two other psychiatrists, 
but the Governor of Florida signed Ford’s death warrant without any 
explanation of his decision or indication of whether Ford’s evidence 
was considered.45
Ford eventually filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seek-
ing an evidentiary hearing on his competency.46  After the district 
court denied the writ and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine two issues: (1) whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the execution of the mentally incompetent, and (2) if so, what consti-
 37 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 n.2 (1987). 
 38 Id. 
 39 477 U.S. 399 (1987). 
 40 Id. at 401. 
 41 Id. at 402. 
 42 FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985).
 43 Ford, 477 U.S. at 403–04 (citing FLA. STAT. § 922.07(2) (1985)). 
 44 Id. at 404. 
 45 Id. at 404, 413. 
 46 Id. at 404. 
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tutional procedures are guaranteed to an inmate who challenges his 
competency.47
B. Court’s Reasoning 
1. Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition on Executing the 
Mentally Incompetent 
With Justice Marshall writing for the majority, the Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally 
incompetent.48  Justice Marshall began by noting that the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence had developed to encompass both 
substantive and procedural requirements regarding the infliction of 
the death penalty.49  Justice Marshall articulated the Court’s modern 
approach to the Eighth Amendment and stated that “the [Eighth] 
Amendment . . . recognizes ‘the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.’”50
After discussing the common law’s prohibition against executing 
the mentally incompetent,51 the Court noted that the common law 
tradition is still in effect in every state.52  Justice Marshall reinforced 
the common law’s justifications against executing the mentally in-
competent53 and concluded, “Whether its aim be to protect the con-
demned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to 
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting 
mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth 
Amendment.”54
2. Procedures for Competency Determinations55
Having decided that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the exe-
cution of the mentally incompetent, the Court then addressed the 
due process procedures guaranteed to an inmate who challenges his 
competency to face execution.  Justice Marshall made it clear that 
 47 Id. at 404–05. 
 48 Id. at 410. 
 49 Ford, 477 U.S. at 405. 
 50 Id. at 406 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
 51 See infra Part II; see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 406–08. 
 52 Ford, 477 U.S. at 408. 
 53 See infra Part II. 
 54 Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. 
 55 There was no majority with respect to the constitutional procedures guaran-
teed to an inmate who challenges his competency to face execution.  See id. at 401 
(noting that there was no majority for the portion of Justice Marshall’s opinion dis-
cussing the required constitutional procedures). 
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even a condemned inmate is protected by the Constitution and 
stated, “Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same 
presumptions accorded a defendant who has yet to be convicted or 
sentenced, he has not lost the protection of the Constitution alto-
gether . . . .”56
Florida law required that an inmate who challenged his compe-
tency to be executed be evaluated by three psychiatrists at the same 
time.57  The governor then made a determination, based on the psy-
chiatric reports, whether the prisoner was competent to face execu-
tion.58  The governor’s policy prevented the inmate’s counsel from 
participating in the competency evaluation process.59  The entire 
competency determination process occurred within the executive 
branch of the state government.60
The plurality indicated that Ford received the protections pro-
vided by Florida’s statutory procedures.61  However, Justice Marshall 
concluded that Florida failed to advance even its minimal constitu-
tional interest in ensuring that mentally incompetent inmates are not 
executed due to several flaws in Florida’s competency determination 
process.62  The first flaw in Florida’s process, according to Justice Mar-
shall, was that the inmate has no input in the determination.63  The 
plurality articulated that any process regarding the decision of 
whether to execute another human is inadequate if it fails to incor-
porate all relevant information, including the presentation of rele-
vant information by the inmate.64
Justice Marshall stated that a second flaw in Florida’s process was 
that the inmate has no ability to question the state-appointed psychia-
trists.65  The plurality doubted the ability of a factfinder to weigh the 
various psychiatric opinions without any questioning of the experts in 
order to evaluate the experts’ methods, conclusions, and potential 
biases.66  The “most striking defect” in Florida’s competency determi-
nation process, according to Justice Marshall, was that the entire 
 56 Id. at 411 (plurality opinion). 
 57 FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985). 
 58 Ford, 477 U.S. at 412. 
 59 Id. at 412–13. 
 60 Id. at 412. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 413. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Ford, 477 U.S. at 414. 
 65 Id. at 415. 
 66 Id. 
STUDEN (FINAL) 1/26/2009  12:32:41 PM 
170 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:163 
 
process was confined within the executive branch.67  Justice Marshall 
was troubled by the fact that the governor, who commands the state’s 
prosecutors, is in charge of making a determination in which the 
governor has had a vested interest since the inmate’s arrest.68
The plurality refuted the idea of “a full trial on the issue of san-
ity.”69  Justice Marshall declined to articulate the necessary proce-
dures to ensure the states adequately enforce their interest in prohib-
iting the execution of the mentally incompetent.70
3. Justice Powell’s Concurrence71
Although the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the execution of the mentally incompetent, the majority did not ar-
ticulate a proper test for courts to employ to determine whether an 
inmate is mentally incompetent, and there was only a plurality with 
respect to the constitutional procedures owed to an inmate who 
makes a competency challenge.  As a result, Justice Powell attempted 
to provide some guidance for courts in making competency determi-
nations.  Justice Powell articulated that the Eighth Amendment, at a 
minimum, prohibits the execution of inmates “who are unaware of 
the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer 
it.”72  According to Justice Powell, this standard satisfies the retribu-
tive goal of criminal law by requiring that an inmate understand the 
connection between the crime and punishment in order to face exe-
cution.73
In terms of the proper procedures guaranteed to inmates who 
challenge their competency to be executed, Justice Powell expressed 
his dissatisfaction with the plurality’s “formal” competency determi-
nation process.74  Justice Powell noted that “[d]ue process is a flexible 
concept” grounded in “fundamental fairness.”75  This fairness, ac-
cording to Justice Powell, requires that an inmate have an opportu-
 67 Id. at 416. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17. 
 71 Because there is only a plurality as to the minimum state procedures necessary 
in the context of competency determinations to ensure a prisoner is given due proc-
ess, Justice Powell’s narrow holding controls on this issue.  See Marks v. United States, 
430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977) (noting that the narrowest grounds of a concurrence con-
trols when “no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Jus-
tices”).
 72 Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 427. 
 75 Id. at 424–25. 
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nity to challenge the state-appointed psychiatrists’ findings and sub-
mit contrary medical evidence.76  Justice Powell summarized his con-
ception of the requirements necessary to satisfy due process: 
[A] constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal 
than a trial. The State should provide an impartial officer or 
board that can receive evidence and argument from the pris-
oner’s counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may 
differ from the State’s own psychiatric examination. Beyond these 
basic requirements, the States should have substantial leeway to 
determine what process best balances the various interests at 
stake. As long as basic fairness is observed, I would find due proc-
ess satisfied . . . .77
C. Effects of Ford on Inmate Competency Determinations 
1. Substantive Competency Test 
Justice Powell’s test for determining an inmate’s competency to 
be executed essentially mirrors the common law prohibition,78 and 
the test has been adopted by the Supreme Court.79  However, Justice 
Powell noted that his test for mental competence represented only 
the constitutional minimum guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment, 
which left states free to create a more “expansive view of sanity.”80
a. Single-Prong Test 
A majority of states adopted Justice Powell’s standard, which is 
commonly referred to as the “cognitive” or “single-prong” test.81  The 
single-prong test focuses on the inmate’s cognitive ability.82  An in-
mate is deemed competent to be executed under this test if the in-
mate is aware of the impending execution and knows the reasons for 
the punishment.83  This test narrowly construes the definition of 
competence by not considering factors, such as mental delusions, 
 76 Id. at 424. 
 77 Id. at 427. 
 78 Bruce Ebert, Competency to Be Executed: A Proposed Instrument to Evaluate an In-
mate’s Level of Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against the Execu-
tion of the Presently Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 34–35 (2001). 
 79 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by At-
kins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
 80 Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring in part). 
 81 Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame”: Competency and the Execution of Condemned In-
mates—A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against the Infliction of 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 105, 134–35 (1994). 
 82 Id. at 135. 
 83 Id. 
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that would allow the factfinder to better assess the inmate’s mental 
state at the time of the competency challenge.84
The restrictive nature of the single-prong test is illustrated in the 
case of Baird v. State.85  In Baird, the defendant knew that he was go-
ing to be executed for killing his wife and parents, but the defendant 
claimed that he did not intellectually or emotionally comprehend 
that he was going to die for the murders.86  The Supreme Court 
noted that Baird may have a mental disorder, characterized by a be-
lief that “God will turn back time to before the murders.”87  However, 
the court concluded that Baird was competent to be executed, within 
the meaning of Justice Powell’s definition of competency articulated 
in Ford, because Baird knew that he was going to die for the mur-
ders.88  As demonstrated, the single-prong test prohibits the consid-
eration of mental delusions in determining an inmate’s competency 
to be executed. 
b. Double-Prong Test 
The double-prong test is the standard adopted by the American 
Bar Association (ABA).89  This test is composed of two independent 
prongs and prohibits the execution of an inmate if the inmate meets 
either the single-prong test, as formulated by Justice Powell’s concur-
rence in Ford, or what is known as the “ability-to-assist-counsel 
prong.”90  The double-prong test is more favorable to prisoners be-
cause the test allows an inmate to proffer evidence regarding the in-
 84 Id. 
 85 833 N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 2005).
 86 Id. at 30. 
 87 Id. at 31. 
 88 Id. at 30. 
 89 See Ackerson et al., supra note 10, at 169.  The double-prong test is stated as fol-
lows: 
(a) Convicts who have been sentenced to death should not be executed 
if they are currently mentally incompetent. If it is determined that a 
condemned convict is currently mentally incompetent, execution 
should be stayed. 
(b) A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental ill-
ness or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature 
of the pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason 
for the punishment, or the nature of the punishment. A convict is also 
incompetent if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the 
convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact 
which might exist which would make the punishment unjust or unlaw-
ful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or the 
court. 
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD § 7-5.6 at 290 (1987). 
 90 Ackerson et al., supra note 10, at 168–69. 
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mate’s rational understanding of the punishment or the inmate’s 
ability to offer exculpatory or mitigating evidence as opposed to sim-
ply being limited to the more stringent single-prong test.91
In Singleton v. State,92 the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
adopted a slightly modified version of the ABA’s double-prong test 
for determining an inmate’s competency to be executed.93  The court 
stated that South Carolina’s adaptation of the ABA’s ability-to-assist-
counsel prong allows an inmate to offer evidence regarding the in-
mate’s ability to rationally communicate with counsel.94  The court 
concluded that Singleton was incompetent to be executed under the 
ability-to-assist-counsel prong of South Carolina’s double-prong test 
because Singleton was “incapable of rational communication” due to 
his inability to properly respond to his counsel’s questions.95  Singleton 
demonstrates the prisoner-friendly nature of the double-prong test 
because the test allows courts to better assess an inmate’s rational 
comprehension of the crime, punishment, and proceedings. 
2. Procedures for Competency Determinations 
Ford did little to establish even the most basic procedures neces-
sary for competency determinations in order to ensure compliance 
with due process requirements.96  From a purely precedential stand-
point, there was no majority on the issue of procedure.  Whereas Jus-
tice Marshall outlined the plurality’s perception of the relevant flaws 
in Florida’s process,97 Justice Powell advocated a more flexible ap-
 91 See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD, Commentary §7-5.6 at 
291 (1987) (noting that the double-prong test “reflect[s] the substantive concern 
that individuals should not be executed while they lack the capacity for rational un-
derstanding of the nature of the proceedings or of the penalty that is about to be 
imposed”). 
 92 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
 93 Id. at 58.  
 94 Id.  The Supreme Court of South Carolina effectively characterized the ABA’s 
ability-to-assist-counsel prong of the double-prong test as requiring an inmate to 
“suggest a particular trial strategy” or “think of new issues for counsel to raise” in or-
der to prevail under the double-prong test.  Id. at 57–58 (citing State v. Harris, 789 
P.2d 60, 66 (Wash. 1990)). 
 95 Id. at 84.  The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that Singleton was 
incompetent under the single-prong test as well.  Id. (noting that Singleton’s disbe-
lief that he would actually die in the electric chair was evidence that Singleton did 
not understand his punishment). 
 96 Gordon L. Moore III, Comment, Ford v. Wainwright: A Coda in the Executioner’s 
Song, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1461, 1469 (1987). 
 97 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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proach.98  However, the Court did reach a consensus on a few basic 
procedures. 
First, an inmate who challenges his competency to be executed 
is entitled to some sort of evidentiary hearing.99  This evidentiary 
hearing must allow the inmate to present evidence on the inmate’s 
mental state.100  Second, the competency decision-maker provided by 
the state must be impartial, which effectively eliminates the governor 
and the executive branch from making the determination due to 
conflicting interests.101  Third, the inmate must be able to challenge 
the state-appointed psychiatrists’ findings.102  Although these proce-
dures may ultimately lead to a battle of the psychiatric experts, it is a 
worthy price to pay to ensure that evidentiary hearings “comport with 
basic fairness” by respecting the gravity of a decision that involves 
whether to take the life of another human being.103
IV. PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN 
The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Panetti v. 
Quarterman104 was not all that surprising.  Justice Powell’s cognitive 
test for competency, as outlined in Ford, failed to resolve the question 
of what constituted mental competence and what information might 
be relevant to a competency determination.105  Panetti’s standby 
counsel framed the issue in the case as follows: 
Does the Eighth Amendment permit the execution of a death row 
inmate who has a factual awareness of the reason for his execu-
tion but who, because of severe mental illness, has a delusional 
belief as to why the State is executing him, and thus does not un-
derstand that his execution is intended to seek retribution for his 
capital crime?106
In the months leading up to the case, the ABA adopted a resolution 
previously adopted by the American Psychiatric Association, the 
 98 See supra Part III.B.3. 
 99 Ackerson et al., supra note 10, at 167. 
 100 Moore, supra note 96, at 1470. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 (Powell, J., concurring in part); Moore, 
supra note 96, at 1478. 
 104 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). 
 105 See Mark Hansen, A Death Sentence Is Brought to Mind, A.B.A. J. EREPORT,  
Apr. 2007, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/a_death_sentence_is_brought_ 
to_mind (last visited Sept. 21, 2008). 
 106 Brief for Petitioner at ii, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-
6407). 
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American Psychological Association, and the National Alliance of the 
Mentally Ill, which urged all states that instituted capital punishment 
to adopt a competency standard that required an inmate to rationally 
understand the reason for the execution.107  Panetti should be viewed 
as a substantial step in the Court’s modernization and clarification of 
its competency-to-be-executed jurisprudence because the Court ac-
knowledged that an inmate’s delusional beliefs, and therefore ra-
tional understanding, of the punishment is relevant to a competency 
determination.108
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In 1992, Scott Panetti, dressed in camouflage, broke into his es-
tranged wife’s house and, in front of his wife and daughter, killed his 
parents-in-law.109  Panetti was tried for capital murder in 1995 in a 
Texas court.110  The state trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation, 
and it determined that Panetti “suffered from a fragmented personal-
ity, delusions, and hallucinations.”111  Although it was also revealed 
that Panetti had been hospitalized several times in the past for delu-
sional behavior, the court found Panetti competent to stand trial and 
he was allowed to represent himself.112  Throughout the trial, Panetti 
exhibited what his standby counsel referred to as “bizarre” behavior, 
characterized by “irrational” and sometimes “incomprehensible” 
ramblings.113  Panetti attempted to subpoena a variety of individuals 
at trial, including John F. Kennedy, the Pope, and Jesus.114  He was 
found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death.115
 107 American Bar Ass’n, Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons 
with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REV. 668, 675 (2006).  The 
ABA summarized its recommendation: 
The underlying point here is that the retributive purpose of capital 
punishment is not served by executing an offender who lacks a mean-
ingful understanding that the state is taking his life in order to hold 
him accountable for taking the life of one or more people. Holding a 
person accountable is intended to be an affirmation of personal re-
sponsibility. Executing someone who lacks a meaningful understanding 
of the nature of this awesome punishment and its retributive purpose 
offends the concept of personal responsibility rather than affirming it. 
Id. at 676. 
 108 See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2861–62. 
 109 Id. at 2848. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 106, at 11. 
 114 Id. at 11–12. 
 115 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849. 
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After Panetti was denied relief on appeal, he filed his first peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Texas.116  Panetti challenged, among other 
things, his competency to stand trial and waive counsel.117  These 
challenges were unsuccessful, and, in October 2003, Panetti’s execu-
tion date was set by the Texas court.118  In December 2003, Panetti’s 
standby counsel filed a motion with the state court under a Texas 
statute,119 claiming that Panetti was incompetent to be executed.120  
After the trial judge denied the motion without a hearing and subse-
quent appeals were unsuccessful, Panetti filed his second petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, challenging his 
competency to be executed.121
At the time of Panetti’s second habeas filing, the state court al-
ready had Panetti’s renewed motion to determine his competency to 
be executed, in which Panetti submitted evidence that contained the 
opinions of a psychologist and a law professor, both concluding that 
Panetti did not understand the reason for his execution.122  The state 
court appointed two mental health experts to assess Panetti’s condi-
tion.123  The two mental health experts concluded that Panetti knew 
that he was going to be executed, the reason for his execution, and 
that his execution would result in his death.124  Based on the state ex-
perts’ reports, and without any indication that Panetti’s evidence was 
considered, the trial court concluded that Panetti was competent to 
be executed and closed the case.125
Panetti returned to the federal district court, seeking a resolu-
tion of his second habeas corpus petition.126  The district court 
granted Panetti an evidentiary hearing to determine his competency 
to be executed.127  On September 29, 2004, the court denied Panetti’s 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05 (Vernon 2001).
 120 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 2850. 
 123 Id.  “If the trial court determines that the defendant has made a substantial 
showing of incompetency, the court shall order at least two mental health experts to 
examine the defendant . . . to determine whether the defendant is incompetent to be 
executed.”  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05(f) (Vernon 2001).
 124 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
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habeas corpus petition based on the hearing.128  The court concluded 
that, under the Fifth Circuit competency test, Panetti failed to dem-
onstrate incompetency to prevent his execution.129  After the court of 
appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.130
B. Court’s Reasoning 
1. Procedural Due Process 
After first concluding that the Court had jurisdiction to review 
Panetti’s petition,131 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, ad-
dressed Panetti’s first claim that the Texas state court deprived him of 
his procedural due process rights in light of Ford.132  The Court stated 
that because Panetti made a “substantial showing of incompetency,” 
he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.133  The majority expressly 
adopted Justice Powell’s minimum procedural requirements for 
competency determinations as outlined in Ford, concluding that an 
inmate who has made the requisite initial showing of incompetence is 
entitled to an “opportunity to be heard,” which includes submitting 
evidence and argument to challenge the evidence presented by the 
state-appointed psychiatrists.134
The majority determined that Panetti made a “substantial 
threshold showing of insanity”135 when he filed his renewed motion, 
which contained the opinion of two experts that Panetti was not 
competent to be executed.136  Justice Kennedy asserted that Panetti 
was denied his procedural due process rights because the state court 
denied him an opportunity to be heard, which is required after the 
defendant makes the requisite showing of insanity.137  Panetti was un-
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 2852.  The Fifth Circuit test for competency to be executed requires that 
a prisoner know “no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual 
predicate for the execution.”  Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (W.D. Tex. 
2004).
 130 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2852. 
 131 The majority concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act’s (AEDPA) prohibition on successive habeas petitions did not apply to a Ford-
based competency challenge when the first habeas claim was ripe for adjudication.  
Id. at 2855. 
 132 Id. at 2855. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 2856 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 424 (1986) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part)). 
 135 Id. (citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring in part)). 
 136 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2856. 
 137 Id. at 2857. 
STUDEN (FINAL) 1/26/2009  12:32:41 PM 
178 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:163 
 
able to submit contrary medical evidence, and the state court made 
its determination on his competence “solely on the basis of the ex-
aminations performed by the [state-appointed] psychiatrists.”138
2. Incorporation of Rational Understanding into 
Competency Determination 
The Court next addressed Panetti’s claim that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids the execution of a mentally ill prisoner whose 
delusions deprive him of the mental capacity to understand that his 
execution is punishment for his crime.139  In order to analyze this 
claim, Justice Kennedy characterized Panetti’s mental state at the 
time of his competency challenge, noting that Panetti suffered from 
the delusional belief that the state’s real reason for executing him is 
to prevent him from preaching.140  Justice Kennedy characterized the 
court of appeals’s relevant findings as to Panetti’s competency: 
“[F]irst, petitioner is aware that he committed the murders; second, 
he is aware that he will be executed; and, third, he is aware that the 
reason the State has given for the execution is his commission of the 
crimes in question.”141
The majority held that the court of appeals impermissibly ended 
its factual inquiry by concluding that Panetti was aware of the reason 
for his execution based on the presence of those three facts.142  Jus-
tice Kennedy articulated that the Fifth Circuit test foreclosed an in-
quiry into Panetti’s delusional state of mind and ultimately his ra-
tional understanding of the reason for his execution, because the 
circuit court concluded that “rational understanding” and “aware-
ness” are not synonymous.143  The Court rejected the narrow Fifth 
Circuit test and stated that Ford did not foreclose an inquiry into an 
inmate’s rational understanding of the reason for his execution.144  
Justice Kennedy asserted that there is no indication that Justice Pow-
ell’s cognitive test in Ford treated delusions as irrelevant to the ques-
tion of an inmate’s “awareness” or “comprehension.”145  The Court 
summarized its holding, “[i]t is . . . error to derive from Ford, and the 
substantive standard for incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 2859. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 2860. 
 142 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2860. 
 143 Id.  For a summary of the Fifth Circuit test, see supra note 129. 
 144 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2861. 
 145 Id. 
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strict test for competency that treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant 
once the prisoner is aware the State has identified the link between 
his crime and the punishment to be inflicted.”146
The Court questioned the retributive value of executing an in-
mate whose perception of the crime and punishment has virtually no 
similarities with those shared by the community.147  Justice Kennedy 
noted that an inmate with a distorted perception of the reason for 
the execution fails to recognize the severity of the crime, which pre-
vents the victim’s surviving family and friends from believing that 
death is the proper punishment.148
The majority recognized the implications of broadening the test 
for competency.  Justice Kennedy noted that more inmates will, based 
on the Court’s holding, challenge their competency to be exe-
cuted.149  However, Justice Kennedy asserted that an inmate’s lack of a 
rational understanding of the reason for the execution would not 
render the inmate incompetent to face execution if the inmate is “so 
callous as to be unrepentant,” “so self-centered and devoid of com-
passion as to lack all sense of guilt,” or “so adept in transferring 
blame to others as to be considered . . . out of touch with reality.”150  
The Court attempted to silence critics of expanding the competency 
test, stating that “[t]he beginning of doubt about competence in a 
case like petitioner’s is not a misanthropic personality or an amoral 
character.  It is a psychotic disorder.”151
Based on the Court’s adoption of a rational understanding com-
ponent into the competency-to-face-execution test, the majority con-
cluded that Panetti’s evidence regarding his delusional state of mind 
should have been considered by the district court.152  Although the 
Court expressly rejected the narrow Fifth Circuit competency test, the 
Court declined to outline a specific competency test for the courts to 
implement.153  However, Justice Kennedy noted that, on remand, the 
district court should consider the evidence of both Panetti’s and the 
state’s physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts.154
 146 Id. at 2862. 
 147 Id. at 2861. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 2862. 
 150 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 2863. 
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C. Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority regarding whether 
Panetti was denied constitutionally mandated procedures for a com-
petency determination and the majority’s approach to creating a new 
substantive competency-to-be-executed test.155  The dissent first ar-
gued that Panetti failed to make the requisite showing of incompe-
tence necessary to even trigger the procedural competency mandates 
implicit in Ford because Panetti’s renewed motion failed to include 
medical records, sworn testimony from a medical professional, or a 
mental health diagnosis.156
Even conceding that Panetti made the requisite showing, Justice 
Thomas concluded that Panetti received the necessary procedures for 
his competency determination as outlined by Justice Powell in Ford.157  
Justice Thomas contended that Panetti was entitled to a competency 
determination made by an impartial board in which Panetti had the 
opportunity to submit contrary medical evidence to that of the state-
appointed psychiatrists.158  The dissent noted that Panetti’s compe-
tency determination was made by the state court, which satisfies the 
requirement of impartiality.159  With regard to the opportunity to 
challenge the state’s own psychiatric examination, Justice Thomas 
stated that the majority failed to highlight the fact that Panetti sub-
mitted a seventeen-page brief objecting to the state-appointed psy-
chiatrists’ reports and that the state court informed Panetti that he 
had the right to submit additional evidence.160  Justice Thomas indi-
cated that the state’s order concerning Panetti’s competency only re-
ferred to the state’s report because the state’s evidence was persuasive 
while Panetti’s was unpersuasive.161
Justice Thomas declined to consider whether the majority’s sub-
stantive standard for competency determinations was proper but re-
jected the Court’s approach to creating a new standard.162  Justice 
Thomas asserted that Ford concerned actual knowledge as opposed to 
rational understanding and that there was no indication in Justice 
Powell’s concurrence in Ford that awareness is synonymous with ra-
 155 Id. at 2867 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas also contended that Pa-
netti’s successive habeas petition should be dismissed under AEDPA.  Id. 
 156 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2868. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 2869. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 2870. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2873. 
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tional understanding.163  The dissent contended that the majority 
took unconstitutional liberties with the language in Ford while failing 
to adhere to the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.164 
V. EFFECTS OF PANETTI 
A. Broadening of “Awareness” in the Competency Test 
At first glance, the Court seems to have simply repeated a previ-
ous course of conduct in Ford by declining to outline a substantive 
competency-to-face-execution standard.  However, by broadening the 
considerations and evidence, a court can take into account when 
making a competency determination, the majority took a significant 
step in modernizing its competency jurisprudence.  Prior to the deci-
sion in Panetti, the law arguably afforded less protection to individuals 
who challenged their competency to face execution than it did for 
those who challenged their competency prior to trial.165  Whether or 
not Justice Powell intended for the single-prong test announced in 
Ford to require no more than an inmate’s factual awareness of the 
reason for the inmate’s execution, a majority of states narrowly inter-
preted the single-prong test in this manner.166
Panetti effectively recognizes that although an inmate may be 
cognitively aware of the state’s pronounced reason for seeking death, 
the inmate may not be able to internally rationalize the stated reason 
due to a mental illness.167  There was no dispute that Panetti was fac-
tually aware that Texas wanted to execute him for murdering his par-
ents-in-law.168  However, Panetti’s delusional state of mind “pre-
vent[ed] him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the 
punishment to which he ha[d] been sentenced.”169
In Ford, both Justice Marshall and Justice Powell recognized the 
important role retribution plays in the institution of capital punish-
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 2874. 
 165 See Greenhouse, supra note 6. 
 166 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part). 
 167 See Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, 
and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 257, 270–71 (2007) (“[P]sychotic de-
compensation associated with severe mental illness can leave such a formal under-
standing intact, while erasing or distorting a person’s ability to recognize the mean-
ing and significance of his behavior and the behavior of others.”). 
 168 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2859 (2007) (majority opinion). 
 169 Id. at 2862. 
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ment.170  Therefore, when viewed in terms of retribution, Panetti logi-
cally evolves from Ford by affirming the principle that there is little to 
no societal value in executing a person who, due to a serious mental 
disorder, has a distorted perception of the reason for punishment. 
B. Invariable Increase in the Number of Competency Challenges 
In her partial concurrence in Ford, Justice O’Connor expressed 
concern over the fact that, as a result of the Court’s conclusion that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of the mentally in-
competent, inmates could repeatedly challenge their competency to 
be executed up until the time of their execution.171  With the Panetti 
Court’s incorporation of rational understanding into the substantive 
competency-to-be-executed test, Justice O’Connor’s concern is even 
more pervasive because inmates have wider latitude to challenge 
their competency.  The Panetti Court did its best to defuse this con-
cern by noting that a “psychotic disorder,” not a “misanthropic per-
sonality,” is the basis for a competency challenge.172
The obvious purpose of this statement is to drastically limit the 
types of mental illnesses that could possibly provide a basis for a 
competency challenge.  The American Psychiatric Association’s Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), 
classifies 297 mental disorders,173 ranging from “antisocial personality 
disorder”174 to “trichotillomania.”175  Clearly, the Court’s classification 
of a mental illness that deprives the inmate of a rational understand-
ing of the reason for the punishment excludes a substantial number 
of the DSM-IV-TR’s mental disorders.176
By requiring a mental problem along the lines of a “psychotic 
disorder,” the Court attempted to establish a clearer rule for deter-
 170 Ford, 477 U.S. at 409 (majority opinion); id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring in 
part). 
 171 Id. at 429 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
 172 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862. 
 173 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS—TEXT REVISION (4th ed. 2000).  The DSM-IV-TR is the leading 
guidebook on psychiatric disorders.  W. John Thomas et al., Race, Juvenile Justice, and 
Mental Health: New Dimensions in Measuring Pervasive Bias, 89 NW. J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 
615, 643 (1999). 
 174 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 173, at 685.  Antisocial personality dis-
order is defined as “a pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others.”  
Id. 
 175 Id. at 674.  Trichotillomania is categorized by “the recurrent pulling out of 
one’s own hair that results in noticeable hair loss.”  Id. 
 176 See Mark Hansen, Mentally Ill Death Row Inmates Get Another Chance, A.B.A. J. 
EREPORT, July 6, 2007, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/jy6panetti.html. 
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mining when there is a sufficient basis for an inmate’s competency 
challenge while at the same time avoiding tying its hands to a select 
number of mental disorders.  However, not even the most cleverly 
crafted medical phrase, such as “psychotic disorder,” can save the 
Court from opening the competency challenge floodgates.  Advances 
in modern behavioral science continue to demonstrate that behavior 
is a “complex phenomenon,” which will certainly give rise to an in-
creasing number of mental conditions that possibly qualify for Eighth 
Amendment protection from execution.177  Nevertheless, the benefit 
of ensuring that no incompetent inmate is put to death far outweighs 
any judicial economy concerns.  The vindication of an inmate’s con-
stitutional rights requires the judicial system to tolerate delays in car-
rying out executions because the issue at stake is literally one of life 
or death.178
C. Continued Procedural Missteps 
In the twenty-one years since Ford was decided, Panetti is evi-
dence that the Texas state courts continue to deny inmates who chal-
lenge their competency to be executed their procedural due process 
rights.  Arguably one of the clearest holdings in Ford is that an inmate 
who challenges his competency is entitled to an opportunity to be 
heard, which includes the submission of contrary medical evidence to 
that of the state-appointed psychiatrists.179  The Panetti Court noted 
that the Texas state court committed an “impermissible” error by de-
nying Panetti these procedures.180  If states were unsure as to the con-
stitutionality of their competency-to-be-executed procedures after 
Ford, Panetti provides enough of an incentive for states to correct their 
constitutionally deficient procedures. 
 177 Steven K. Erickson, Minding Moral Responsibility 12 (Yale University Working 
Paper Series), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008863. 
 178 See Harding, supra note 81, at 141.  Of course, there is not unanimous support 
for this position.  See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State, 
and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 399–400 (1962) (noting that the 
prohibition against executing the incompetent precludes any judicial finality on the 
issue of an inmate’s competence because an inmate’s competence can change after a 
previous competence determination). 
 179 Ebert, supra note 78, at 34. 
 180 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2857 (2007). 
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VI. CRAFTING A COMPETENCY-TO-BE-EXECUTED TEST181
Although the Panetti Court concluded that Ford does not pre-
clude an inquiry into an inmate’s rational understanding of the rea-
son for the state’s decision to impose execution, the Court expressly 
declined to articulate a competency-to-be-executed test for district 
courts to implement.182  To construct a competency test, it is impor-
tant to be cognizant of one underlying consideration raised by Justice 
Kennedy: an inmate’s competence raises an issue as to whether the 
inmate rationally understands the reason for execution only if there 
is evidence of a “psychotic disorder.”183  With this in mind, courts 
should look outside the narrow area of the competency-to-be-
executed doctrine and consider the larger framework of legal compe-
tencies in general, of which the competency to be executed is merely 
a sub-category of adjudicative competence.184  These other legal com-
petency doctrines are instructive in determining the factors relevant 
to a competency determination. 
A. First Element: Presence of Delusional Behavior 
The first prong of a competency test should determine which 
inmates have a proper basis for making a competency challenge due 
to a mental condition.  The DSM-IV-TR categorizes nine Axis I clini-
cal disorders as psychotic disorders: schizophrenia, schizophreniform 
disorder, schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder, brief psychotic 
disorder, shared psychotic disorder, psychotic disorder due to a gen-
eral medical condition, substance-induced psychotic disorder, and 
psychotic disorder not otherwise specified.185  Schizophrenia, the 
most common psychotic disorder on the list, is categorized by severe 
 181 Part VI addresses the incorporation of “rational understanding” into the com-
petency-to-be-executed framework.  An inmate who lacks a factual understanding of 
the reason for execution is still incompetent under Panetti.  The Court acknowledged 
that the competency inquiry does not end simply because an inmate has cognitive 
awareness of the reason for execution.  See id. at 2862 (noting that an inmate who 
can identify the factual basis for the state’s reason for execution is not foreclosed 
from challenging his competency). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” and the Crimi-
nal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1382–83 (2006).  Adjudicative competence 
includes all relevant competency determinations in the criminal context, including 
pleading guilty and waiving the right to counsel.  Id. at 1383.  The competency to 
contract, to execute a will, and to consent to medical research are just a few of the 
legal competencies, along with adjudicative competence, that make up the frame-
work of legal competencies.  Id. at 1382. 
 185 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 173, at 297. 
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distortions to a person’s thinking and behavior that even compro-
mises the individual’s ability to care for himself.186
The DSM-IV-TR’s use of the word “psychotic” is meant to denote 
individuals who exhibit symptoms including hallucinations, delu-
sions, disorganized speech, or grossly disorganized or catatonic be-
havior.187  Delusions and hallucinations affect an individual’s method 
of rationalizing his environment, which includes “the motives and 
meanings of others’ behavior.”188  Individuals with schizophrenia may 
be unable, at times, to distinguish delusions from reality.189  In Panetti, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that Panetti’s delusion—that is, his belief 
that Texas’s actual motivation to execute him was to prevent him 
from preaching—was relevant to a consideration of whether Panetti 
rationally understood the reason for his punishment.190  Delusions 
cross the line from being acceptable beliefs to unacceptable beliefs.191  
Therefore, a component of a competency-to-be-executed test must 
examine whether the type of delusional behavior exhibited by Panetti 
exists. 
Courts have attempted to define what constitutes a delusion for 
purposes of other competency determinations.  These definitions are 
generally synonymous with the DSM-IV-TR’s discussion of delusional 
behavior.  For example, in In re Estate of Scott,192 the California court 
addressed delusional behavior in the context of the competency to 
execute a will.193  The plaintiff widower husband claimed that his de-
ceased wife was delusional at the time she executed her will, believing 
that her husband was unfaithful and that her husband was trying to 
poison her.194  The court articulated a definition of a delusion: 
If the belief or opinion has no basis in reason or probability, and 
is without any evidence in its support, but exists without any proc-
ess of reasoning, or is the spontaneous offspring of a perverted 
imagination, and is adhered to against all evidence and argument, 
the delusion may be truly called insane; but if there is any evi-
 186 Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 368 (2006). 
 187 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 173, at 297–98. 
 188 Ryan & Berson, supra note 186, at 366. 
 189 Honberg, supra note 3, at 1161. 
 190 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2862 (2007). 
 191 Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 962 (1991). 
 192 60 P. 527 (Cal. 1900). 
 193 Id. at 528. 
 194 Id. at 529. 
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dence, however slight or inconclusive, which might have a ten-
dency to create the belief, it cannot be said to be a delusion.195
This definition of delusion distinguishes beliefs that have no eviden-
tiary basis whatsoever from beliefs which might have a factual basis.  
In other words, patent falsehoods form the basis for delusional beliefs 
and behavior.196
The first element to a proper competency-to-be-executed test 
need not—although it certainly would aid in the competency deter-
mination process—require a finding of a DSM-IV-TR Axis I psychotic 
disorder.  Rather, the question should be whether there is a discon-
nect between the defendant’s “reality” and the actual world due to 
the presence of a delusional state of mind that potentially precludes 
the defendant from rationally perceiving and understanding the 
state’s rationale for choosing execution as punishment for the under-
lying crime. 
B. Second Element: Capacity to Rationalize 
Having determined that a competency-to-be-executed test must 
first determine whether the defendant’s behavior and current mental 
state is sufficient to make a competency challenge, the next consid-
eration is whether the defendant satisfies the ever-elusive rational 
understanding standard.  It goes without saying that rational under-
standing is, in some form, a component of other legal competency 
doctrines.  In the realm of the competency-to-stand-trial doctrine, the 
question is whether the defendant rationally understands his interac-
tions with his attorney and whether the defendant rationally, as well 
as factually, understands the legal proceedings against him.197  The 
competency-to-make-medical-decisions framework asks whether the 
patient can effectively reason and understand the health procedure 
at issue.198  With regard to the insanity defense, most state jurisdic-
tions allowing the defense use a definition of criminal insanity de-
rived from the M’Naghten test.199  A defendant has a defense to 
 195 Id. at 528–29. 
 196 Saks, supra note 191, at 963. 
 197 Maroney, supra note 184, at 1385–86. 
 198 Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and Jurispru-
dential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L. REV. 995, 
1038 (1991). 
 199 Jessie Manchester, Comment, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the Insanity 
Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 NW. J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIM. 713, 716 (2003).  See, e.g., State v. McGhee, 742 N.W.2d 497, 669 (Neb. 2007) 
(noting that Nebraska follows the M’Naghten test) and State v. McLaughlin, 725 
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criminal liability under the M’Naghten test if the defendant, at the 
time the act was committed, did not know: (1) “the nature and qual-
ity of the act he was doing”; or (2) that the act was morally wrong.200  
This second prong of the insanity defense effectively incorporates a 
rational understanding component into a determination of legal cul-
pability.201
The common thread that weaves these various legal competency 
doctrines together is an analysis of whether the defendant possesses 
sufficient mental capabilities for comprehension and reasoning in 
order to understand the circumstances surrounding the underlying 
decision, crime, legal proceedings, and so on.  In the criminal law 
context, in general, the decision to mitigate a defendant’s blame or 
punishment is a product of the belief that the defendant should not 
be responsible unless the defendant possesses “a reasonable capacity 
for rationality.”202  As Justice Kennedy noted, punishment serves no 
proper purpose when, due to gross delusions, there is a disconnect 
between the crime and punishment.203  The second prong of the 
competency-to-be-executed test must inquire whether the inmate 
possesses a reasonable capacity for rationality in order to compre-
hend and reason, independently of the mental disorder, through the 
state’s rationale for deciding that the inmate will be executed. 
This definition of rationality highlights the shortcomings of and 
expands on Supreme Court precedent.  In Rees v. Peyton,204 the Court 
addressed the role of competence and rational understanding in the 
context of whether a defendant could direct his counsel to terminate 
post-conviction proceedings.205  The Court stated that the lower court 
on remand should determine whether the inmate had the “capacity 
to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to 
continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand 
whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect 
which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”206  The 
Rees test essentially deems a prisoner rational for purposes of aban-
N.W.2d 703, 708 n.3 (Minn. 2007) (noting that defendants who plead insanity in 
Minnesota must meet the M’Naghten standard). 
 200 Peter Western, The Supreme Court’s Bout with Insanity: Clark v. Arizona, 4 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 143 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 201 Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 289, 294–95 (2003). 
 202 Id. at 294. 
 203 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2862 (2007). 
 204 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam). 
 205 Id. at 313. 
 206 Id. at 314. 
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doning further litigation if the prisoner’s decision was not attribut-
able to a mental disorder.207  In most circumstances involving the ter-
mination of post-conviction litigation, courts find inmates competent 
under the Rees test because, generally, inmates understand that the 
result of abandoning further litigation will be execution, which con-
stitutes rational choice under the test.208
There are two related problems with applying the Rees test’s 
definition of rationality in creating a competency-to-be-executed test.  
First, Panetti adopted a significantly broader interpretation of rational 
understanding than had previously been recognized.209  To the extent 
that Rees only requires an awareness that execution will occur if fur-
ther litigation is foregone, in order to find the existence of rational 
choice, this is inconsistent with Panetti.  Second, the Rees test fails to 
adequately address the prisoner’s stated reason for wanting death.210  
As long as an inmate can proffer a seemingly rational reason for 
abandoning further litigation, courts generally will not dig deeper to 
determine if a mental disorder is substantially limiting the inmate’s 
thought process.211  Panetti expressly rejected this approach to analyz-
ing an inmate’s rational understanding by stating that delusions can 
severely distort an inmate’s perception of reality so as to render the 
inmate incompetent.212  After Panetti, an inmate is no longer pre-
cluded from challenging his competence to be executed merely be-
cause the inmate appears to have a rational understanding of the 
state’s reason for seeking execution.213  The Rees test is analogous to 
the limited Fifth Circuit competency-to-be-executed test that the 
Court ultimately rejected in Panetti because both tests assume that a 
prisoner who appears rational at times is therefore rational for pur-
poses of competence determinations. 
 207 See Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for 
Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1187 (2005). 
 208 Id. at 1186.  See, e.g., Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 613, 617 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that the inmate was competent to abandon post-conviction relief be-
cause he thought further litigation would be fruitless, despite believing that after 
death he would be part of a “Holy Trinity” with God, that he had many concubines 
and children in various parts of the world that he had visited while in prison, and 
that he had once visited heaven). 
 209 See Bonnie, supra note 207, at 1186 (noting that a prisoner’s awareness of the 
state’s reason for seeking death is not the same as a rational understanding of that 
reason). 
 210 Id. at 1188. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2863 (2007). 
 213 Id. at 2862. 
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The definition of rationality proposed here, unlike in the Rees 
test, takes into account the reality that an inmate’s mental condition 
can significantly affect a seemingly rational thought process.  For ex-
ample,214 consider an inmate convicted of murder in Texas who, at all 
times after his trial, including while awaiting execution, suffered from 
schizophrenia, although it was not properly diagnosed until after 
trial.  Assume the following: (1) the inmate knows that the state is 
seeking his death for his crime; (2) the inmate does feel and exhibit 
remorse for his crime; (3) the inmate exhibits delusional behavior at 
times, believing that he must sacrifice his life to the state for the state 
to release his family from captivity; and (4) the inmate’s remorse is 
actually an attempt to appear competent in order to face execution 
in order to further his delusional belief. 
Under the Rees test, if the inmate chose to abandon post-
conviction relief, the inmate would probably be deemed competent 
to make this decision because the court would conclude that the in-
mate made the rational choice to do so out of remorse.  In other 
words, the court would probably not assess the degree to which the 
delusional behavior affected the inmate’s seemingly rational and 
genuine feelings of remorse.  Now assume the aforementioned facts, 
except that instead of believing that he must sacrifice himself to save 
his family, the inmate does not want to die, and he believes that the 
state actually wants to execute him to prevent him from becoming 
“ruler of the world.”  The definition of rationality proposed here asks 
whether the inmate possesses a sufficient capacity for rationality in 
order to comprehend and reason, independently of the mental dis-
order, through the state’s reason for seeking execution.  If the in-
mate challenged his competency to be executed under this definition 
of rationality, the inmate would probably not be competent to be 
executed.  The inmate’s delusional beliefs compromise his rationality 
to the point where his reality is severely distorted. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court took a significant step in expanding its 
competency-to-be-executed jurisprudence in Panetti by affirming the 
principle that an inmate who does not possess a rational understand-
ing of the state’s reason for execution is incompetent to be executed 
under the Eighth Amendment.  By recognizing that an inmate’s delu-
sions are relevant to a competency determination, the Court rejected 
 214 This example is not intended to suggest that the test for the competency to be 
executed should be the same as the test for the competency to abandon post-
conviction relief. 
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a narrow interpretation of competency derived from Ford and left it 
to district courts to determine what constitutes rational understand-
ing.  In order to craft a competency test based on the Court’s ration-
ale in Panetti, courts should look outside the narrow framework of 
competency to be executed.  The other areas of legal competencies 
are instructive for purposes of analyzing what criteria are relevant to a 
substantive competency test. 
